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Viviane Reding, whose term as Vice-President 
of the European Commission is about to end, is 
probably right to claim that “the elections of the 
European Parliament matter more than those of 
national parliaments because their outcome will 
affect the future of an entire continent,”1 but 
convincing the citizens of that state of affairs 
will be no easy task. Evidently, convincing 
Belgian political party leaders and media officials 
will be just as hard. 
However, more than ever the future of the 
Belgians and their children will be decided at the 
European level. Change will come from the 
Union, because no single Member State – not 
even mighty Germany or nuclear powers like 
France or the United Kingdom – can hope to go 
solo on the international scene.  Against all 
odds, there is strength in unity, “l’union fait la 
force.” 
At the European level, the Belgian people is well 
aware of this fact. The Autumn 2013 
Eurobarometer
2
 revealed that even after 5 years 
of crisis, 70% of them still identified as 
European Union citizens, a number well over 
the Union average of 59%. On the other hand, 
only 47% felt that their vote actually gives them 
a say, which isn’t so bad compared to the… 
66% of Europeans that think the very opposite. 
Another study done at the request of the 
In the City, the citizen is king. At least 
theoretically. In the European City 
currently being built around twenty-
eight national democracies, the citizen 
will soon be called upon, in May, to 
democratically elect his or her 
representative in the European 
Parliament for the next five years. Since 
the very first election of Members of the 
European Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage in 1979, spectacular 
progress has been made by the 
“European Economic Community” that 
we now all know as the European 
Union. And the powers vested in citizen 
representatives are equally impressive. 
But there is a real possibility that 
European citizens will turn their backs 
on the upcoming European elections 
like never before. Why? 
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Commission
3
 found that 73% of respondents 
felt a gain in influence with local and regional 
elections, a number that falls to 70% for 
national elections… and even worse, to 54% for 
European elections. Such a mindset is clearly 
not conducive to the enthusiastic exercise of 
electoral right. In countries where, unlike 
Belgium, voting is not compulsory, this could 
result in record-breaking abstention levels. 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AT THE 
SERVICE OF THE ELECTORATE 
The European does not deserve this scorn. For 
two reasons. 
Firstly, the Lisbon Treaty that came into force 
on the 1st December 2009 broadened the scope 
and increased the prerogatives of Members of 
the European Parliament (MEP) considerably.  
Therefore as the legislative arm of the European 
Union, the European Parliament became co-
legislator in 90% of cases as opposed to 60% 
under the Treaty of Nice, and the number of 
fields falling under the purview of the ordinary 
legislative procedure that puts MEPs and 
ministers on an equal footing rose from 33 to 
73, including the sensitive areas of Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA). If anything, this proves 
that European citizens do have a say, through 
the representatives they will elect on 25 May. On 
that day, they will be the decision-makers, those 
that, as explained by Vice-President Vivane 
Reding, will affect tomorrow’s Europe: “Voters 
can decide whether Europe should take a more social or a 
more market-oriented direction. Voters can decide 
whether the future majority in the European Parliament 
will favour opening Europe's borders to immigration or 
build a Fortress Europe; whether we are tough with the 
U.S. when it comes to data protection or genetically-
modified organisms, or whether we will instead favour the 
economic benefits of free trade.”
4  
Secondly, the truth is that the European 
Parliament makes generous use of the powers it 
was granted, most often in the interest of the 
individuals to which it is accountable: the 
European voters! “The European Parliament is 
paying very close attention to the individual when making 
use of its prerogatives,” argues Professor Josiane 
Auvre-Finck, Director of the Centre for the 
Study of European Organisations Law 
(CEDORE) from the Université Nice – Sophia 
Antipolis, in recognition of its “constant concern” 
for the increased protection of the individual.
5
 
There are many examples of this. 
 For instance, the European Parliament 
argued at length for the Erasmus+ budget to 
be increased by 40% compared to last year : 
over 4 million students under the age of 
thirty will thus be able to go abroad to study 
or receive training between 2014 and 2020; 
the previous figure was 2.8 million students. 
In addition to this, MEPs put their political 
affiliations aside long enough to push 
through a soft loan mechanism enabling 
students of lesser means to earn a Master’s 
degree abroad. Such an investment in 
education and youth is common sense, but 
the programme would not have been as 
successful had the European Council been 
alone to call the shots. 
 In a similar spirit, last November, the 
Parliament overwhelmingly approved a 
directive draft designed to ensure that the 
boards of directors of publicly listed 
companies would aim to have 40% of 
women directors by 2020 (as opposed to 
17% at present). Even better, the MEPs 
chose to add the “exclusion from all public 
invitations to tender” to the list of sanctions 
against uncooperative companies devised by 
the Commission. Could any female citizens 
of the EU disagree with this show of 
parliamentary assertiveness? 
Furthermore, the European Parliament is 
working on an overall strategy to ensure a high 
degree of consumer protection: 
 Starting tomorrow, you will be able to buy a 
charger for your smartphone regardless of its 
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make. Thanks to European representatives 
that proved more demanding than even the 
Commission, the maximum cost of a call 
abroad from a mobile phone went from 
€0.35 per minute to €0.24 in 2013, and will 
fall to €0.19 on 1 July 2014 to coincide with 
the start of the holidays for tens of millions 
of citizens. And it doesn’t stop here: from 
2015 onwards and if MEPs have their way, 
roaming charges will be scrapped. Who could 
complain about that? 
 A desire to strengthen EU tobacco law led to 
a revision process during which the 
electronic cigarette was discussed extensively. 
In order to promote their spread, the 
Parliament has authorised their sale from 
specialised stores and tobacco sellers, in 
contradiction with the proposal of the 
Commission and against the initial wishes of 
Member States, who wished to restrict their 
sale to pharmacies. The resulting health gains 
are undeniable. 
Even more so than as a consumer, pampered 
and cared for extensively, it was the European 
citizen as an individual bearer of a set of rights 
and fundamental rights that stood at the very 
heart of all the work done by the European 
Parliament during its previous legislative term. 
Time and again, European representatives made 
it very clear that the current obsession with 
security would not infringe freely on citizens’ 
rights to benefit from the highest degree of 
protection for their personal data. They 
requested the close examination of agreements 
made with the United States for the exchange of 
data, such as that of airline passengers for 
instance, to make sure that they are still relevant 
and justified in the current context. After an 
unambiguous vote in July 2012, the Parliament 
chose to discard the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) that would have forced 
Internet access providers to share the personal 
data of individuals found guilty of illegally 
downloading intellectual property with the 
copyright holders outside of any legal 
framework 
In terms of equity, the restrictive influence of 
the European Parliament over the supervision 
of bankers’ bonuses should also be underlined in 
the larger context of the consolidation and 
stabilisation of banks. It succeeded at making 
these bonuses the result of long-term 
performance rather than their short-term 
benefits. 
All of these elements underline the fact that 
European citizens can tip the parliamentary 
balance one way or another. Therefore, why are 
they once again willing to take the risk of not 
showing up in sufficient numbers for their next 
opportunity to cast a ballot? Why choose to 
express their disagreements with policies that 
have nothing to do with how the future of 
Europe is built? This question cannot be 
answered unequivocally, but there are clues we 
can follow to more or less identify the various 
facets of the reasons behind the democratic 
malaise that the European Union is going 
through. 
THE EUROPEAN PROJECT IS A WORK IN 
PROGRESS 
First off, there is no denying that the European 
project is still a work in progress and quite 
outlandish from the point of view of classical 
representative democracy. Why? Because in the 
European Union the representative of the 
sovereign-citizen must often compromise, and 
are sometimes left to talk away without any 
influence on the decision-makers. 
For example, let us look at the February 2013 
European Council that dealt with the 
Multiannual Financial Framework for 2014-
2020, a set of restrictive measures that will affect 
the European Union for the upcoming 7-year 
period. A few days later, Alain Duhamel would 
comment that “on this occasion, we witnessed 
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egotistical national outbursts of uncommon ferocity and 
the decline of any hope for solidarity,” and he came to 
the conclusion that “euroscepticism won this round. 
The Europe of 27 goes down the path of a simple free 
trade area just like London had dreamed of all along. 
The United Kingdom more than ever combines the 
world’s best diplomacy with the least European mindset 
of the Northern Hemisphere.”
6
 Usually a very 
moderate figure, French MEP Alain 
Lamassoure, Chairman of the Parliament’s 
Committee on Budgets, also intervened: “We are 
dealing with twenty-seven Mrs Thatcher around the table: 
each and every one of them is obsessed with getting 
something out of the European budget whilst at the same 
time contributing as little as possible to it.”
7
 Is this 
really how the interests of 500 million European 
citizens are best served? Is this how general 
interest will triumph? 
Naturally, a large majority of MEPs are opposed 
to this ruling and worked until the month of 
November to remedy the situation as much as 
possible. Eventually they obtained that the 
seven-year plan – not even the USSR dared 
anything longer than five-year plans sniggered 
some of them – would be re-evaluated midway 
through to take into account the evolution of 
the economic context and to put a high-level 
working group in place tasked with finding a 
solution for the Union to return to “own 
resources” financing, freed from its dependence 
on national budgets. For the rest… 
For the rest, nothing! Nothing because the 
financing system of the European Union 
remains, in the words of jurist Aymeric Potteau, 
“the strict prerogative of the unanimous European 
Council and of the Member States that have to ratify the 
decision on own resources,”
8
 while the European 
Parliament is limited to providing an advisory 
opinion as per the Lisbon Treaty. In other 
words, the sovereign is made voiceless and 
disintegrates into twenty-eight state actors 
talking in its stead. In reality, the Parliament will 
only come to fill its role when it can share 
voting power on resources rather than just on 
how to spend them. It’s a long way off! 
The truth is that citizens are not alone in their 
role of sovereign of the European City: they 
share this role with those that lead their 
respective States for the duration of their term 
and provided that they hold a majority in their 
parliament. Even the European Constitution 
dropped in 2005 by the French and Dutch 
people was not trying to hide this fact: whereas 
the Constitution of the United States as drawn 
up by the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 reads 
“We, the people of the United States…”, the 
European text read “we, the representatives of the 
Members States”. It’s not quite the same thing… 
From this point of view, it matters little whether 
or not the measures taken to keep in check the 
multifaceted crisis that overwhelmed the Union 
after the subprime debacle were adequate. This 
is an issue of political relevance. The result is 
that the heads of state and government proved 
themselves capable of preventing the 
catastrophe. It’s also important to know whether 
or not the methods and procedures that lead to 
the adoption of these measures were fully 
respectful of the basic principles of democracy: 
were they or weren’t they democratically 
legitimate? 
In the eurozone, the crisis was so intense that 
European decision-makers had no choice but to 
equip themselves as quickly as possible with an 
arsenal of measures and countermeasures – 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG), European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), etc. – that they would have 
deemed completely strange or even out of place 
mere minutes before the crisis began. It took 
until the crisis gained in intensity for example in 
Greece, Ireland or Portugal for political wills to 
thaw. The start of… genuine economic 
governance in the European Union and the 
eurozone was delivered with the help of forceps. 
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And often behind the closed doors of meeting 
rooms for the exclusive use of the members of 
the European Council. 
As aptly observed by Yves Bertoncini, Director 
of “Notre Europe”, the think tank founded by 
Jacques Delors, “the participants involved in the 
European Councils and the eurozone summits (…) 
became part of a crisis governance, subject to the 
unyielding scrutiny of the media that made it possible for 
observers and the public at large alike to grasp the 
interests and stakes at hand, despite the use of 
doublespeak by some heads of state.”
9
 The void of 
economic governance was filled in a hurry by 
heads of state and government. Evidently, there 
is no case to be made against this as 
democratically-speaking these Presidents and 
Prime Ministers possess the highest degree of 
legitimacy in their own countries at the national 
level. However, for many actors and observers 
of the European project this is a real issue. 
This technocratic and intergovernmental 
management of the crisis was a boon for the 
strongest players amongst the European Council 
– and on the field, too. We owe Régis Debray 
for the accuracy of the following metaphor: “If a 
concert calls for a conductor, with or without a podium – 
Prussia for the German Reich or Piedmont for Italian 
unity –, it’s only normal in these economy-driven times 
for Germany to be holding the baton.”
10
 This image 
makes sense, but it is dangerous; and it is utterly 
absurd in the European Union, lest we allow it 
to fatally regress. 
Under pressure from the state of emergency and 
the balance of power within the European 
Council once community good manners are laid 
aside, and thus under the pressure exerted by the 
strongest Member State that is Germany, 
European leaders had no choice but to opt, 
gladly or not, for a federalism “tinged with 
ordoliberalism,” in the words of French economist 
Edwin Le Héron.
11
 This mixture was fertile 
ground for discipline and austerity at the four 
corners of the European Union and led to the 
birth of the Troika. But are we certain that a 
policy that proved itself in one country, 
Germany in the present case, will be just as 
successful in other countries? Philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas thinks to the contrary that the 
policy being made to dominate Europe and 
defended by the (previous) Berlin government is 
a mistake for three reasons, the first two being 
the following: “Firstly, Angela Merkel is 
unrelentingly pushing her own model onto other countries. 
As written by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, she is 
squandering the trust that previous German governments 
spent half a century earning. Secondly, she is carried 
forward by the misguided belief that everything will be 
fine as long as countries respect the rules of the stability 
pact and she’s obsessed with sanctions.”
12
 
Consequently, the Europe of the European 
Council – and that of Germany in particular – 
has been giving the impression that it wants to 
impose a return to budgetary stability regardless 
of the cost to the citizens from countries 
“guilty” of slip-ups punished by the markets. 
From an economic standpoint, was this a sound 
strategy? Some doubt it. 
From a psychological point of view, trying to 
impose this “austeritarian Europe” condemned by 
Nobel prize winner Paul Krugman has highly 
damaging consequences. First off because the 
responsibility of this burden was placed in its 
entirety on the shoulders of the countries guilty 
of having a lax budgetary stance. Within the 
“virtuous” countries (but who could forget that 
France… and indeed Germany were the first 
countries in the eurozone to take liberties with 
the rules set out by the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), having escaped sanctions thanks 
only to their considerable influence?), citizens 
were led to believe, with the indirect help of 
national government and media officials, that 
they had to “pay the bills for the extravagant lifestyle 
of the other Europeans”,
13
 in the perceptive – but 
sad – words of Fabian Amtenbrink from 
Erasmus University Rotterdam. And yet 
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according to Paul De Grauwe, it’s the very 
opposite: “Fundamentally speaking, citizens from 
Northern Europe should be made aware that the crisis is 
the result of more than just the irresponsibility of 
Southern Europe and the accumulation of high external 
debts. It originates from Northern Europe and its boom 
years behaviour during which it supplied Southern 
countries with surplus banking credits without a 
moment’s thought. For each careless loan being requested 
by the South, there was a careless loaner ready to grant it 
in the North.”
14
 
Therefore it’s no surprise that it heralded a 
return to name-calling, to the point that even a 
thinker like Panagiotis Sotiris, who teaches social 
and political philosophy at the University of the 
Aegean, resorted to describing the “reactionary 
mutation” of the Union in those virulent words: 
“Listen to the way they talk during those meetings of the 
Eurogroup or of European summits. That tone of voice is 
aggressive, arrogant, they speak as if they they were 
granting themselves the power to impose diktats on society 
– going so far as to making fundamental changes to 
quality of life. Listen, for example, to the German 
Finance Minister suggesting that Greece should 
temporarily put democracy aside: this isn’t so different 
from neocolonialism.”
15
 It’s an understatement to 
say that Pandora’s box, which had been sealed 
by the Schuman Declaration six years after the 
end of the Second World War, has been 
reopened following the events of the European 
Council. 
Once again, the way in which this policy was 
chosen matters: “behind closed doors”, like at the 
“time of the Congress of Vienna, where national interests 
came first, and outside of any democratic control.”
16
 
Even academic observers that tend to agree with 
the principle that, at the European Council and 
in the Union, some can be “more equal than 
others,” admit like Yves Bertoncini that “the 
primacy of the Merkozy duo, at the expenses of the 
principle of formal equality between Member States of the 
EMU and the EU” might have shocked some of 
them from a democratic point of view: “The 
economic power, and thus the contribution capacity 
differentials (…), have indeed contributed to the 
legitimation of the variable weight of Member States in 
decisions about the use of the EFSF and the ESM. The 
emergence of the Franco-German duo and its domination 
of other heads of state and government, both in its form 
and substance, shocked a lot of people, as it went against 
the normal behaviour at the European level, where actors 
strive to solve problems between  countries by 
consensus.”
17
 
Which brings us to the third mistake identified 
by Jürgen Habermas, who believes that the 
intergovernmental collaboration at the heart of 
Merkel’s modus operandi has led to the 
“hollowing out of the democratic process,” as this 
circumvention of national parliaments’ financial 
laws is nothing short of a consecration of “the 
unprecedented self-empowerment of the executive.”
18
 To 
be absolutely clear, this state of affairs was 
translated by a journalist as the “coup by the 
executive, that is by the European Council, and through 
it of the national executives.”
19
 Is this statement 
insignificant because it is an exaggeration? Many 
will no doubt think so among those working to 
build a Union without undoing the sovereign 
prerogatives of the Member States. However, a 
doubt remains as evidenced by this question 
from MEP Sylvie Goulard: “Who controls the 
European Council, this collective monarch who takes its 
decisions behind closed doors with no room for debate, no 
intention to be held to account, and who cannot be 
overthrown?” In answer to this question from the 
French representative, grumbling journalist and 
federalist Jean-Pierre Gouzy would reply: “The 
legitimation of its members at separate national elections 
that have barely anything to do with Europe are no 
longer enough.”
20
 One cannot help but note that 
Yves Bertoncini is not denying the federalist’s 
claim when he adds that it is “at the heart of 
Member States that the democratic deficit” in terms of 
the governance of the Economic and Monetary 
Union, “can be felt most tangibly when numerous 
governments can take key decisions at the European level 
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without being subjected to any kind of control or in-depth 
public scrutiny and debate.”
21
 
WHAT CAN THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN DO 
ABOUT THIS? 
Because of these “opposing currents”, the 
European citizen can react in two ways. The 
first one is unfortunately the most likely one: he 
will desert the ballot booth in May like he never 
had before, or he will cast his vote in favour of 
extremist parties, both to the right and to the 
left of the spectrum, as long as they identify as 
eurospectic as a result of their nationalism, or 
even as completely europhobic. The analysis of 
a collective carried by Daniel Cohn-Bendit in 
anticipation of the last French presidential 
election is, in that respect, irrefutable: “When part 
of the population is struck hard, when the majority feels 
vulnerable and confused, when the future is bleak, we 
embellish the past and feel safer when turning back upon 
ourselves; sovereignty is a comfort and being open is scary. 
And thus Europe is put at a distance. Populists from the 
right and the left rush into the vacuum and make an easy 
scapegoat out of Europe.”
22
 The demonstration is 
irrefutable, not even for Belgium, albeit to a 
lesser degree… 
The second possible reaction would be for the 
citizen to rise against the tricks being played on 
the European project and to want to use his or 
her vote to remedy the flaws mentioned above. 
In the European City, things can indeed change 
if the citizen decides to truly take up its role of 
sovereign and to design the European Union it 
wants. 
To that end, the sensible voting citizen could, 
for example, probe the heart of the candidates 
vying for the ballot to find out whether, once 
elected, they will carry on with the fight for the 
defense of the democratic principles that was 
consistently carried out by many of their 
predecessors during the legislative term about to 
end. “Until now, the European representatives have 
played a useful role consisting in giving discussions and 
debates directions with a view to reorganize the EMU,” 
as underlined by researcher Yves Bertoncini, 
immediately adding that: “They were able to do it 
with the support of extensive reports and resolutions 
(…). The European representatives thus contributed to 
passing on the positions and expectations voiced by their 
electorate, but did so without the institutional power to 
impose their point of view on the main decision-makers” 
of the Economic and Monetary Union.
23
 
At the very least, the voting citizen should have 
the right to request of the man or woman that 
will represent him in the plenaries of Brussels 
and Strasbourg for the next five years the 
commitment to endeavour to “make the European 
Council accountable to the European Parliament” for 
all issues pertaining to the management of the 
eurozone in some way or other that still needs 
to ascertained, as specified by Ambassador 
Philippe de Schoutheete, previously Belgium’s 
permanent representative at the European 
Union, and  Stéphane Micossi, reminding us that 
this will require the Treaty to be revised and that 
this will be no easy task.
24
 They believe that the 
European Council should remain the main 
executive power of the Union, “with the 
Commission playing a central role in the implementation 
of common policies rather than working to initiate and 
select them.”
25
 Very specifically, the budgetary 
guidelines to be respected by Member States in 
the framework of the European semester 
procedure should remain as a sole prerogative of 
heads of state and government under the 
parliamentary scrutiny – both national and 
European – that would need to be strengthened. 
It seems out of the question that the design of 
these guidelines could be left to any other 
institution than the European Council because it 
will place a heavy burden on governments and 
place them under threat of automatic sanctions: 
“Asking of the European Parliament to deal directly 
with such constraints would turn it into a political 
matter, making the procedure less automatic, less 
predictable and therefore less credible,”
26
 conclude the 
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Belgian diplomat and College of Europe 
professor. 
This analysis is very perceptive and it is similar 
in spirit to the prevalent opinion found in the 
circles where Europe has been devised until 
now. A state of mind that is perfectly embodied 
in a couple of sentences from a recent report co-
authored notably by Pierre de Boissieu, who 
worked as France’s permanent representative to 
the European Union and as the Secretary-
General of the Council, by Stephen Wall, who 
worked as the United Kingdom’s permanent 
representative to the European Union, and by 
Antonio Vitorino, who was European 
Commissioner for Portugal:  
“The apparent logic, which would consist in progressively 
replacing national democracies with a hypothetical 
European democracy, can only end with failure. It’s 
fanciful to think that a hybrid system can be transformed 
into a perfect and constitutionally rational construct. 
Democracy at the European level will have to coexist 
with the democratic procedures of each Member State, 
procedures at the local, regional and national level, and 
complement them. One should not attempt to replace, but 
to establish pathways for communication and 
complementation between the various levels.”
27
 
Perfectly lucid, this point of view has been 
prevalent in Union since its very beginning. 
Nevertheless it is still being challenged by some 
because managing the common good that is the 
euro will be increasingly difficult in the context 
of national instructions in favour of state 
sovereignty and of democracies conceived and 
designed exclusively on the national level. As 
noted by economist Philippe Herzog who also 
worked as an MEP, the “the sovereignty of nation-
states becomes a moon, an agent of obscurantism when we 
need to conceive a future to build together in Europe and 
the world.”
28
 Jean-Claude Juncker, long-serving 
Prime Minister of the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg and president of the Eurogroup, 
the gathering of Finance ministers from 
countries of the Eurozone; showed us the limits 
of this kind of political management when he 
declared: “we know everything that needs to be done; 
what we don’t know is how to get reelected if we do it” – 
which made Hugues de Jouvenel raise the 
question whether “our governing officials, in our 
democracies, are capable of having a real interest for 
issues pertaining to long term public interest”
29
… 
Against this background accusations were fired, 
such as the one from Mark Leonard and José I. 
Torreblanca, active members of the European 
Council on Foreign Relations: “If by sovereignty we 
mean the capacity of citizens to choose what they want for 
their country, neither Northern nor Southern Europeans 
feel sovereign very often. A substantial part of democracy 
has disappeared from the national level, but has not been 
transferred to the European level.”
30
 This is the heart 
of the issue for more and more observers. 
The more ambitious European voters, quite 
possibly dreamers and utopians in equal part, 
could also ask of the man or woman vying for 
their ballot whether he or she can agree to take 
action in favour of real European elections, 
freed of the shackles currently being kept in 
place by 28 national democracies, so that true 
European democracy can finally take flight. The 
picture painted by Mark Leonard and José I. 
Torreblanca might be a little grim and too 
inspired by Goya’s darker moments, but it does 
describe a reality that according to many, can no 
longer be ignored: 
“In a national political system that works properly, 
political parties should be able to express diverging points 
of view – and could even act as arbiters to help them find 
a consensus. But this is precisely what the European 
political system cannot do: because it does not have real 
parties, a real government and a public sphere, the 
European Union cannot compensate for the failings of 
national democracies. Instead of being a teeming heart for 
competing ideas, the Union finds itself sucked into a 
vicious circle where anti-European populism bumps into 
technocratic agreements between Member States scared by 
their own citizens.”
31
 
  
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
9 
 
Until the 25 May, in Belgium, political parties 
will campaign around what is and will remain at 
the core of their profession: the federal level, 
and the regional level. Will the candidates for 
the European elections manage to make 
themselves heard about slightly different issues? 
Maybe slightly, but they will not be noticed by 
many. And if they are elected on the 25 May, 
they will soon learn that for five years they will 
be far removed from their party, much like 
European journalists are far removed from their 
editorial boards, so different are the 
preoccupations of national politics. 
Consequently, the ambitious and romantic 
voting citizens could possibly ask of the men 
and women vying for their vote whether they 
are ready to fight for this very ballot to become 
identical in all Member States, governed by the 
same electoral process, if only to prevent the 
fourth representative on a list to be denied a seat 
after receiving more votes than the person in 3rd 
position if the party only has three seats, just 
because the hierarchy is decided internally. They 
could also ask these candidates if they are ready 
to fight during the upcoming legislature for 
European electoral campaigns to no longer be 
conducted by national parties but by European 
parties having filled and outgrown their 
currently empty husks, with real political 
programmes, conceived and approved in 
support of European public interests, shorn of 
the trappings and restrictions of national parties. 
Maybe the European citizen will ask of 
whomever can receive this ballot whether he or 
she will fight to make the European Council 
take the results of the May election into account 
when choosing the next President of the 
Commission. These are all demands that, if met, 
would prevent the 2019 European elections 
from being robbed of their momentum by 
political eddies, all twenty-eight of them… 
Will all of these demands ever produce real 
results? That remains to be seen, but they will at 
the very least add to the debate on democracy 
and birth life into a public European sphere that 
still remains largely absent today. In this fashion, 
it’s not impossible that the sovereign citizen will 
eventually shake things up, create a new layer of 
genuine European democracy no longer held 
hostage by the national, regional, and local levels 
of democracy that it will nonetheless continue to 
cooperate with. This is the end for which it will 
have to fight, maybe for longer than a single 
legislature… 
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